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IAbstract
An important issue in federalism is: “What factors of a constitution determine
the enforcement of property rights?” Two such factors that have received scrutiny are 
the separation of powers within the central government and protest by social groups
over what they view as a transgression of their rights. I argue that a third factor is at
least as important in terms of enforcement: the distribution of authority in the regional
governments and the nature of regional appointments significantly affect the
incentives of key regional officials, which in turn affect the bargaining power between
the central government and regional governments. I argue regional decisions to follow
or not to follow central government orders are influenced by distribution of regional
authority and the nature of appointments. My theory is supported by case studies in
Chinese and Roman institutional history.
Keywords: Federalism, institutions, constitution, political economy and property
rights.
摘要
聯邦制的一項重要議題為：「憲法之何種因素決定財產權的執行？」對此，
已有兩種因素受到廣泛的討論，分別是中央政府內之分權，以及社會群體對其權
利遭逾越之反對。就執行的角度來看，本研究提出另一個至少與此二者同等重要
的因素，即地方政府中權力的分配以及地方官員任用的本質，其會對地方主要官
員的誘因產生重大的效果，進而影響中央政府與地方政府間之議價能力。我認為
地方對是否要遵循中央政府命令的決定，受到地方權力分配以及官員任用本質的
影響。此理論可以得到中國以及羅馬制度史案例研究的支持。
關鍵詞：聯邦制、制度、憲法、政治經濟、財產權
11. Introduction
Over the past year, my research has been supported by a grant from the NSC
(NSC 94–2415–H–032 –009). Much progress has been made. My theory relates
both the authority structure and the nature of appointments in the regional
governments to the bargaining power between the central government and its regional
governments. This theory has improved by a more detailed comparison of institutional
features across the Han and Tang dynasties in China and the Roman Empire. It should
also be mentioned that the comments of one of the referees of my grant application
proved very helpful by noting that reforms under emperor Han Wudi are also relevant
to my analysis. Indeed, research over this past year on this topic proved this
suggestion to be true and very beneficial.
My research project is entitled, “Federalism, Regional Control and Property 
Rights.” This research addresses an important topic in constitutional theory –a
country’s property right system. Litle is known about the factors that determine the
system of property rights. Analysis often begins with the state and proceeds to include
the relationship between the state and individuals. Two factors have been identified
and well studied. First is the separation of powers within the central government, a
political organization that issues orders to the regional governments, which in turn
issue orders to local residents and provide enforcement. Through competition, the
separation of powers places constraints on the orders that can be issued. Second is
protest by social groups that view government actions as transgressing their rights.
Social protest or the threat of social protest places limits on what rules can be
enforced.
My research emphasizes a third factor–the authority structure of the regional
governments and the nature of the appointment system for key regional government
officials. These features determine the bargaining power between the central
government and its regional governments. In this context the relative bargaining
power works to determine enforcement of rules in the regions where conflict of
interest between the central government and the regional governments exists. Many
important issues are relevant. What share of taxes do regional governments forward to
the central government? If the central government issues a rule to be enforced in the
regions, is the rule enforced as directed? By focusing on the balance of power
between the central government and its regional governments, we can see how social
resistance to the central government play an important role in determining property
right enforcement throughout the country. The results of this research project will
2include a journal article, which will subsequently appear as a chapter in a book.
This final report presents descriptions of aspects of my research as well as the
results and conclusions reached this past year. The remainder of this report is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review, section 3 presents an
outline of the research project’s goals, section 4 describes the research methodology 
used and section 5 presents the results and conclusion.
2. Literature Review
Constitutional theorists have defined features of the design of state institutions
that limit the ability of the state to expropriate wealth. Political scientists and political
economists have focused most of their attention on a three factors: (i) the separation
of powers, (ii) social protest, and (iii) regional policy competition. First, there is the
separation of powers within the central government. The argument is that checks and
balances within the central government will limit the capacity of the state to intrude
on rights of citizens. This is an established theory going back at least two centuries to
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws and the American Federalist Papers.1 Some
modern work in this area by political economists includes Greif (1998) and North and
Weingast (1989). Greif (1998) argues that in the historical case of twelfth century
Genoa, a balance of power among clans checked the state. North and Weingast (1989)
argue that the separation and balance of powers within the central government are the
main checks on the government.
Second, a large body of literature argues that groups in society check the state by
various means of social protest against what they interpret as transgressions of their
rights, characterized by coordination costs among groups in society and the general
agreement of beliefs as to what constitutes a transgression. Recent work in this field
includes Ferejohn (1991), Shapiro (1993) and Weingast (1995, 1997). Ferejohn (1991)
argues that the distribution of beliefs of citizens over what constitutes a transgression
determines the ability of groups to act in concert in limiting intrusive state behavior.
In order words, coordination costs increase as the distribution of beliefs diverges.
Shapiro (1993) argues that political elites play a more important role than do the
masses in limiting state policies. Weingast (1995) argues that group challenges to state
policy transgressions are central. Weingast presents much political history to support
his case. He describes the political history of seventeenth century England and argues
1 See Montesquieu (1989) and Hamilton, et al. (1999).
3that a coincidence of beliefs on the legitimacy of the actions of the king was the key
to constraining the central government. In the case of America, he argues that after the
acceptance of the United States Constitution, citizens were generally in agreement as
to what constituted a policy transgression. Weingast (1997) argues that groups of
elites play an important role in checking transgressions of the state and in initiating
transitions to democracy. English political history is presented to support his
arguments.
Third, there is a large literature that emphasizes the role of regional policy
competition in the constraint of the choice of policy. The seminal paper in this field is
Tiebout (1956), where regional tax competition is argued to be a constraining force. A
large literature in local public finance has developed this argument.
Another related literature is in the general field of federalism. Important works in
this field include Riker (1964, 1975).2 The theory developed over the past year differs
from the work on federalism in an important way. Modern work on federalism has
proposed few specific mechanisms that constrain the state in a federal union. In
general, the work neglects to highlight specifically that in a federal system which
keeps the central government in check. In contrast, my theory focuses on a specific
mechanism of the constitution and outlines how it operates.
My research this past year addressed an important question: “What features of a 
constitution determine the choice of policy and the property right system?” The 
separation of powers of the central government clearly plays a role, but is not a
complete answer. The central government is located in a capital city. Its orders are
issued to regional governments for enforcement. The separation of powers in the
central government places constraints on the type of orders that are issued. In focusing
exclusively on the central government, the issue of enforcement is completely
neglected. How are the policies of the central authority enforced throughout a vast
country? Clearly the regional governments enforce the orders. However, the
incentives of the key regional officials play an important role. This has been the focus
of my research. The separation of powers is also related to my theory in the sense that
it may affect the incentives of regional officials to enforce central government
directives. Also relevant is the social groups check on regional governments.
In my view a complete analysis of the checks on the state, must include all three
factors: (i) separation of powers in central government, (ii) structure of authority in
2 Some aspects of North (1990) also related.
4regional governments, and (iii) the restraint on transgressions of the state created by
social groups. The first and third factors have been studied extensively. There has
been relatively little on regional government role in policy determination and very
little work has identified specific features of regional governments in the context of
the constitution that work to constrain the state. Lastly, this work distinguishes itself
from much of the related literature in that it presents numerous historical case studies
to show the relevance of this factor in determining policy and property right
enforcement.
3. Research Goals
My research this past year has been the systematic study of the reforms of
particular emperors in Chinese history and one major reform of the Roman Empire.
Studying this institutional history was done in the context of theory. Before describing
further the methodology and results, it will be helpful to first describe the theory.
My theory focuses on an institutional factor of regional governments: the
structure of authority. By the structure of authority I mean the distribution of authority
among key regional officials and the nature of regional official appointments. I argue
that the structure of authority in regional governments has major influence on the
choice of policy and the property right system. The authority structure affects the
incentives for key regional officials to follow the orders of the central government.
The range of policies that the central government can enforce is limited by the
capacity of the regional governments to follow orders and their willingness to enforce
central directives. The rights enforced by the regional government are determined by
the susceptibility of key regional officials to the influence of regional interest groups.
I argue that the structure of authority in the regional governments affects the degree to
which key officials can be influenced by regional vested interests.
Regional or provincial governments such as China’s Fujian province or 
America’s state of California are political-military units. A fundamental function of
these organizations is to support an army for the security of people in the region.
These political-military units are the building blocks of large countries, which are
unions of such regional governments. These regional governments have two main
levels of administration–upper and lower. The upper level has considerable authority
over the lower units. In the case of California for example, the state administration
seated in Sacramento manages the affairs of lower level administrations–the counties
5and cities of California. These regional governments retain their cohesion from the
level of military threat. During civil wars countries break into groups of these
provinces and use their armies to determine the outcome. One does not see such
countries break into a thousand counties or cities to fight a civil war because, given
the level of military threat, the resources of a county or city are insufficient to provide
security. Thus the military threat provides a natural motivation for lower level
administrations to yield authority to upper level provincial administrations. This
arrangement reduces coordination costs in military defense and allows fiscal and
judicial services, among others, to be performed by the upper level administration.
Thus the provincial officials play an important and pivotal role. They control the
administrative apparatus that supports a large coercive force that checks external
threats, which includes an excessive central government, and plays an important role
in maintaining law and order within the province. I shall focus on the role of the key
provincial officials and the factors that shape their incentives to follow the directives
of the central government and to enforce rules within the province.
Consider two extreme examples which demonstrate how the distribution of
authority among the key regional government officials plays an important role.
Suppose one all-powerful military governor has the authority to order the provincial
officials to follow him in an act of rebellion.3 Is this in the interests of the military
governor? As the leader of a successful rebellion, he will be rewarded handsomely
with honors and wealth within the region. Although the focus is on the threat of
rebellion, it must be recognized that the act of rebellion is a part of the endgame in a
conflict with the central government. While this threat may not always be realized in
practice, it underlies the bargaining power of the regional government in determining
what central government directives are enforced. In this sense it is similar to the
influence of a threat of a labor union strike on wage contract negotiations between
management and a labor union.
At the other extreme, consider a regional government with ten powerful
governors of equal rank. Suppose the provincial institution is such that for major
policy decisions all ten governors must agree. Now the act of rebellion requires the
consent of ten key regional officials. If the region successfully rebels, honors and
wealth will be bestowed upon all ten. The rewards for each are now less than when
there was one all-powerful military governor. The expected rewards may not now be
larger than expected costs. The incentives of the key regional officials in enforcing
3 Note that even the military governor faces some political constraints in ordering his subordinate
officials to rebel with him as well as constraints of key social groups within the region. But for the sake
of clarity, we abstract from these political constraints here.
6central directives are shaped in part by the distribution of authority. The central
government may wish significant taxes forwarded to the capital, but the orders
actually issued may vary with the type of regional government institutions. The
central government may feel free to order a regional government with ten governors
to forward a large sum of tax revenue, but when facing a single military governor may
not dare risk such an order. Thus the range of enforceable central government policies
varies with the distribution of authority among the key regional officials.
This mechanism also links the distribution of authority among key regional
officials and property rights. The number of key officials is related to the ability of
local groups to influence the enforcement of property rights. Assume that one
all-powerful regional military governor receives an edict from the central government
to enforce monopoly rights in the region. Property rights may be restricted by the
enforcement of this edict. Knowing the stakes involved, those affected may seek to
influence the enforcement decision by lobbying the military governor to resist
enforcement of monopoly rights, possibly with the offer of payments or benefits. In
contrast, consider the case where there are ten governors of equal rank. Now the
interested group must influence the decisions of all ten. Given the same resources as
in the previous case to influence the outcome, they may be unable to secure the
needed support. Thus, given that the directives from the central government restrict
the property rights of some group in a region, the distribution of authority among key
regional officials affects the ability of the interested group to interfere with their
enforcement. In sum, the distribution of authority among key regional officials affects
the bargaining power of regional interests over policy enforcement through the threat
of rebellion and the ability of interested parties to influence officials.
The second feature I consider is the nature of regional appointments, here
defined as the relationship between the key regional officials and those who have the
authority to appoint, promote, punish and replace them. Regional officials are
concerned with the influence of their current decisions on their future well being.
Thus they will strongly consider the concerns of those who may promote or punish
them in the future. Regional officials appointed by the central government will have a
strong incentive to please the central government in enforcing its edicts. If, on the
other hand, groups in the region appoint the key regional officials, the incentive to
enforce central government directives is diminished. The nature of regional
appointments is clearly a fundamental factor. Indeed, wars are fought over the right of
regional appointment. When a central government encounters resistance, one of the
first things it does after conquest is to appoint a military governor in charge of
7regional affairs, e.g. in Indian provinces and American colonial states in the British
Empire.
My constitutional theory can be summed up as follows. The process of
determining enforcement of various central government edicts and rights, including
property rights, in a region is largely influenced by the distribution of authority among
regional officials and the nature of regional appointment. The distribution of authority
affects the bargaining power of regional interests through the threat of rebellion and
the ability of local groups to generate support for enforcement of favorable rights
among the key regional officials. The nature of regional appointment plays an
important role in shaping the incentives of the key regional officials by tying their
future well being to an evaluation of their current decisions.
This research distinguishes itself from other theoretical constitutional analysis in
that its major thrust is to present examples from both Chinese and Roman institutional
history that support these theoretical arguments. Next I shall describe the
methodology used and finally the results and conclusions.
4. Research Methodology
The method of study required systematically researching numerous books and
articles that discuss aspects of Chinese and Roman institutional history. This was an
extremely labor intensive project and the help of research assistants was much needed.
I am grateful for the support provided by the NSC.
Research topics covered included the early Qin/Han federal relations, a Han
Dynasty reform, a major reform of the Tang Dynasty, reforms of the Song Dynasty,
and a major reform in the Roman Empire. The findings of this year’s work wil be 
outlined next.
5. Results and Conclusion
   This past year’s research has been very productive and has led to adraft
article which has already been solicited for submission by the editor of the Pacific
Economic Review, an SSCI journal. The article will be submitted to this journal
around the end of this year.
8The basic findings of this year’s work include a comparative analysis of various
reforms in the Spring & Autumn / Warring States period, Han Dynasty, Tang Dynasty,
Song Dynasty and the Roman Empire. It should be noted that a particularly helpful
comment by one of the referees of my NSC grant application suggested that I look
into some of the reforms of the emperor Han Wudi. Indeed, the reforms under this
emperor proved to be similar to the ones previously identified. This suggestion is
gratefully acknowledged.
During the Spring & Autumn / Warring States period, contiguous regional
governments composed of counties (縣) and commanderies (郡) formed. This process
of regional government formation culminated in the first unification of China in 221
B.C. by Qin. During the 8th to 3rd centuries B.C. numerous reforms included the
creation of counties. A comparison of these reforms suggests some fundamental
functions of a regional government. In particular, a regional government is a
political-military unit and the key officials in the upper level influence government
decisions within the region.4
During the Han Dynasty, the emperor Han Jingdi introduced some centralizing
reforms. During this period the regional governments had developed into a three-level
administration, kingdom (國) –commandery (郡) –county (縣). A kingdom had
several commanderies, which were composed of numerous counties. The head of the
kingdom’s administration was a king (王). After the suppression of the Seven Kings
Rebellion in 154 B.C. the central government stripped some of the commanderies
from the authority of the kingdoms. Kings were allowed to keep their titles and
privileges but were removed from kingdom administration. The independent
commanderies were appointed separate officials and a key official of the reduced
kingdom was appointed by the court. The central government, at the end of a civil war,
gained a measure of control over the regional governments by diffusing regional
authority, previously in the hands of the king, among several key regional officials.
Similar reforms were carried out under emperor Han Wudi, who allowed relatives of
the kings to take up lower-level positions in the counties, but acknowledged the
authority of an adjacent commandery. In other words a trade was struck where sons of
kings could take up county posts, but the kingdom would lose this county.5
4 Refereneces used for this period include 田昌五，安作璋 (1993), 姜文奎 (1987) and 商文立
(1980).
5 References used for the Han Dynasty reforms include田昌五，安作璋 (1993), 楊樹藩 (1963) and
嚴耕望 (1997).
9Similar reforms were carried out by the emperor Tang Xianzong (805 –820
A.D.). After the An Lushan Rebellion (755 –763) regional military governors
established themselves as regional governors throughout the country. During this
period, there were essentially three-level regional governments, military governors
(藩鎮)–prefectures (州)–counties (縣). A typical military governor had three to five
prefectures under his control. Emperor Tang Xianzong successfully stripped many
military governors of many of their prefectures, particularly in military affairs. In
effect, military governors were restricted to the resources of one prefecture to support
their army. The other prefectures previously under their control became militarily
independent and reported to a different official. We can see the diffusion of regional
authority clearly at work. In 977 the emperor Song Taizong implemented a similar
reform in northern China that effectively removed prefectures from under the control
of regional military governors.6
Finally, the case of the Roman Empire was considered. After civil war in 284
A.D. the Roman emperor Diocletian implemented a major reform of the provinces
throughout the Roman Empire, creating one hundred provinces where there had
previously been fifty. Because there was no change in the amount of land or people in
the empire, the effect of this reform was to split the typical province into two. The
resources originally under the control of one provincial governor now came under the
authority of two. Thus China is not the only country in pre-modern times to use the
technique of authority diffusion in order to control the regional governments.7
A very clear pattern emerges from this comparative analysis. Central
governments spread regional authority among numerous key regional officials in
order to gain control of the regions. This, pattern supported with numerous examples
in Chinese and Roman institutional history, has produced the foundation for a paper
that makes a compelling case for a simple theory in the important and fundamental
field of federalism. The research assistance provided by funds from the NSC was
invaluable and is gratefully acknowledged.
6 References for the Tang and Song dynasties include 王壽南 (1969), 李天石 (1995), 周寶珠
(1985), 竺沙雅章 (1988), 張其凡 (1991), 張國剛 (1987), 賈玉英 (1989) and 韓國磐 (1979).
7 References for the Roman Empire include Jones (1964), Millar (1977) and Williams (1985).
10
References
（一）中文部分
王壽南 (1969) ，《唐代藩鎮與中央關係之研究》，台北：嘉新水泥文化基金會。
田昌五，安作璋主編（1993），《秦漢史》，北京：人民出版社。
李天石（1995），《唐憲宗》，吉林：吉林文史出版社。
周寶珠（1985），〈北宋統一和集權〉，收入周寶珠、陳振主編，《簡明宋史》，北
京市：人民出版社。
竺沙雅章（1988），《宋太祖与宋太宗》，方建新譯，西安市：三秦出版社。
姜文奎（1987），《中國歷代政制考》，台北：國立編譯館。
商文立（1980），《中國歷代地方政治制度》，台北：正中書局。
張其凡（1991），《趙普評傳》，北京市 : 北京出版社。
張國剛（1987），《唐代藩鎮研究》，湖南：湖南教育出版社。
楊樹藩（1963），《兩漢地方制度》，台北：國立政治大學。
賈玉英（1989），〈太宗的官制改革〉，收入鄧廣銘、漆俠編，《宋史論文集》，第
94-106 頁，河北：河北教育出版社。
韓國磐（1979），《隨唐五代史論集》，北京：新華書店。
嚴耕望（1997），《中國地方行政制度史》，台北：中央研究院歷史語言研究所。
（二）英文部分
Ferejohn, John (1991), “Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in
Early Stuart England,” in The Economic Approach to Politics, edited by Kristen
Monroe, New York: Harper Collins Press.
Greif, Avner (1998), “Self-enforcing political systems and economic growth: Late
medieval Genoa,” Analytic Narratives, edited by R.H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi,
J.L. Rosenthal, B.R. Weingast, pp. 23-63, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay (1999) The Federalist Papers,
edited by Clinton Rossiter, with a new introduction and notes by Charles R.
Kesler, New York: Mentor.
Jones, A.H.M. (1964), The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic, and
Administrative Survey. Volumes 1 and 2. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Millar, Fergus (1977), The Emperor in the Roman World. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Montesquieu, Charles (1989) The Spirit of the Laws, edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia
C. Miller and Harold S. Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11
North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast (1989), “Constitutions and Commitment: 
The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-century
England,” The Journal of Economic History, 49: 803-832.
Riker, William H. (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company.
Riker, Wiliam H. (1975), “Federalism,” in Handbook of Political Science, Volume 5,
edited by F. I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, pp. 93-172, London:
Addison-Wesley.
Shapiro, Ian (1993), “Democratic Innovation: South Africa in Comparative Context.” 
Review article, World Politics 46 (1): 121-50.
Tiebout, Charles (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures,” Journal of
Political Economy 64: 416-424.
Weingast, Bary R. (1995), “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market 
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development,” Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 11: 1-31.
Weingast, Barry R. (1997), “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of
Law,” The American Political Science Review 91:245-263.
Williams, Stephen (1985), Diocletian and the Roman Recovery. New York: Routledge
Press.
